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The papers in this Symposium issue complement two other compilations of
research on the multilateral trading system published in Evenett and Hoekman
(2006) and Hoekman and Vines (2007) and are a ﬁnal output of the UK
Department for International Development supported Global Trade and Financial
Architecture project. The genesis of this Symposium was a CEPR workshop
hosted by the OECD in March 2012 with support from DG Research (grant:
PEGGED Collaborative Projects under the EU’s Seventh Framework
Programme, Contract no. SSH-CT-2008-217559). Draft papers were presented at
a conference at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington
University, hosted by Michael Moore in April 2013. We are very grateful to
Frank van Tongeren at the OECD and Mike Moore at the Elliott School for their
support of the meetings, to Michelle Chester and Rebecca Martin at the World
Bank for help with logistics, to the participants in both events, especially the
discussants, and to Alan Winters and an anonymous referee for comments on the
submitted papers.
In 2001, Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) launched the Doha
Development Agenda (DDA), the ﬁrst multilateral trade negotiation (MTN) held
under WTO auspices. The agenda comprised a mix of traditional market access
policies that have been the bread and butter of MTNs since the 1960s – efforts to
reduce the maximum permitted import tariffs for goods (so-called tariff bindings)
and agricultural production support – and issues that had been added to the
table in the Uruguay Round ─ such as policies affecting trade in services. Many
WTO Members also wanted the DDA to focus on new subjects not covered by
the WTO: policies on foreign direct investment, competition law, transparency in
government procurement, and trade facilitation. Disagreement at Doha led WTO
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Members to defer a decision on whether to negotiate on these subjects to the 2003
Ministerial meeting in Cancun. Consensus proved impossible to achieve at Cancun,
and only one of the four issues, trade facilitation, was eventually included in the
DDA negotiations.
The DDA has been characterized by repeatedly missed deadlines and signiﬁcant
periods of deadlock. In recent years, many countries increasingly have turned their
attention towards negotiation of preferential trade agreements, including so-called
‘mega-regional’ initiatives, such as the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP) and the
Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Trade in services – a
core element of the DDA –was effectively taken off-line by a set of countries that
are now seeking to negotiate a Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) on a plurilateral
basis. These mega-deals are envisioned as going well beyond the current insti-
tutional mandate of the WTO. So far none of them include all three of the big
players: China, the EU, and the US. Indeed, China is not part of any of them.
More generally, the mega-regionals do not include most developing countries.
There is a risk of the global trading system fragmenting into discriminatory
blocs, with plurilateral systems running parallel to the WTO that cover regulations
and standards well outside the mandate of the WTO, yet increasingly important to
the basic mechanics of global production and trade.
At the 2013Ministerial Conference in Bali, a ‘development package’was agreed,
comprising a set of decisions on matters of importance to developing countries,
including a new Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The TFA was innovative in
several respects, including being conceived as a stand-alone agreement and in the
approach taken to recognize differences in implementation capacity across the
WTO membership. Bali was widely seen as a major positive result for the WTO
as an institution, as it demonstrated it was possible to agree to new trade policy
rules that applied to all Members. But hopes that Bali would permit additional pro-
gress on the DDA were dashed in July 2014 with the refusal by India to agree to the
TFA Protocol unless its demands regarding the rules for agricultural production
support were addressed. At the time of writing, it is unclear whether the Bali
package will be saved. Even if it is, it is clear that the call by Ministers in Bali for
a work program to be developed by the end of 2014 that offers a road map for con-
cluding the DDA will not be met. And if the Bali package cannot be saved, the
WTO membership will be confronted even more starkly with the question as to
whether new multilateral rule-making is still desired; and if so, looking forward,
what the lessons are from the Doha experience for cooperation in the WTO.
This last question motivates the articles included in this Symposium issue, which
focus on the ‘legislative pillar’ of the WTO, as opposed to analysis of speciﬁc pol-
icies that create international spillovers, or of the successful elements of the current
WTO architecture such as its dispute settlement and transparency functions. The
articles assess what research suggests regarding the reasons for the failure of the
DDA and the design of modalities for negotiating new multilateral rules of the
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game for policies that affect international production and trade in goods and
services.
The ﬁrst three contributions reﬂect on the lessons of the DDA. Robert Wolfe ana-
lyses the various reasons that have been put forward for why the DDA has not been
a success, arguing that this is primarily a reﬂection of the structural changes and
power shifts over the past two decades, most notably the growth of China. The
launch of the DDA and China’s accession to the WTO both occurred at the
Doha Ministerial meeting, with little thought given to the implications of the
latter for the former. He concludes that although mistakes were made in the
choice of negotiating modalities, there is nothing ‘wrong’ with the WTO and
that a precondition for constructive engagement on new rules is a trans-Paciﬁc
accommodation between China and the US, something he argues that will not be
delivered by the various regional trade arrangements that are being pursued.
Yvan Decreux and Lionel Fontagné analyse the negotiating set that was estab-
lished by the DDA and show that this resulted in a ‘landing zone’ that was too
small to make a deal feasible. The economic beneﬁts of what was on the table
once all exceptions and ﬂexibilities are accounted for were not large enough to
offset the political costs that would accompany implementation of a deal. The
late stage effort to introduce zero-for-zero sectoral agreements would have given
rise to asymmetrically distributed costs and beneﬁts, as well as substantial political
costs in some emerging economies, precluding agreement. They argue that the
analytical tools used by economists to assess the impacts of trade agreements
should have been taken more seriously by negotiators as they clearly revealed the
limited prospects for agreement based on the modalities that were used, as well
as the importance of considering the DDA agenda as a package – including services
and trade facilitation.
Laborde and Martin assess the formulae that were used in the agricultural and
non-agricultural market access (NAMA) negotiations. Formulae approaches
have long been favoured by economists in MTNs on efﬁciency grounds ─ it is
not feasible for countries to negotiate on thousands of products with 150+ other
countries on a bilateral basis. The non-linear formula for NAMA that was
adopted in the DDA would have reduced tariff peaks much more than other
tariffs. While this increased potential welfare gains, it also increased political
pain, reducing the scope for an agreement.
Paola Conconi and Carlo Perroni turn to a key feature of the WTO: special and
differential treatment (SDT) of developing countries. SDT is a response to the het-
erogeneity of the WTO membership, involving ‘less than full reciprocity’ by devel-
oping countries in negotiations and calls on developed countries to provide
preferential access to markets. They provide a theoretical analysis of SDT, conclud-
ing that it is in fact consistent with the principle of reciprocity that is at the core of
WTO negotiations, as it helps developing nations liberalize trade gradually. A key
element of the argument is that deeper and more rapid liberalization by developed
nations helps developing countries build trade (export) capacity so that over time
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the relative size of import substituting industries can shrink and imports can then be
liberalized. A key element for SDT to ‘work’ is that there is conditionality in the
sense that SDT is a time-bound mechanism. Thus, there must be a credible mech-
anism that results in ‘graduation’. The insistence of many OECD countries in the
DDA that large emerging economies do more to liberalize access to their markets –
such as the proposal for sectoral deals – can be understood on the basis of this
analysis.
Emily Blanchard discusses the implications of the changes that have occurred in
the structure and organization of world trade: the rise of supply chain trade, inter-
national production sharing, and cross-hauling of foreign direct investment (FDI).
She summarizes recent research on the incentives for governments to manipulate
domestic behind-the-border policies that affect trade and welfare through their
impacts on investment; how these incentives may be one of the factors underpin-
ning the rise in preferential trade agreements (PTAs); and what this implies for
policy cooperation in the WTO – including a need to revisit the decision not to
negotiate disciplines on investment policies.
Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis argue that WTO Members should
pursue more club agreements under the umbrella of the WTO, both critical mass
agreements where beneﬁts are extended to all WTO Members, and plurilateral
agreements where beneﬁts are conditional on signing the agreement. They note
that the outside option for WTO Members – the formation of a PTA –will often
be less desirable from a trading system and multilateralist perspective than plurilat-
erals, as the latter ensure open access, are more transparent, and provide access to a
common dispute settlement mechanism. Moving towards more plurilaterals will
require measures to reduce the scope for only a few countries to block the consen-
sus needed for adoption of new agreements into the WTO. Work is also needed to
allow incorporation of new agreements that involve cooperation on regulatory
measures that are applied on a non-discriminatory basis.
John Odell discusses what research suggests on how WTO Members should go
about setting the agenda for another comprehensive round of negotiations if they
decide to do so. He emphasizes the large information problem that confronts gov-
ernments in designing an agenda that will not suffer from the problems identiﬁed by
Wolfe and Decreux and Fontagné and suggests the WTO Membership should do
much more than it has done to commission objective, outside negotiation analysis
to identify issues that are complementary in the sense that joint action will substan-
tially increase the potential gains from cooperation. He also argues for adopting
negotiating modalities that encourage countries to form clubs on issues, with the
outcomes of club agreements linked to each other in a limited single undertaking
that binds only club members.
Finally, Doug Nelson turns to the question of whether and how the WTO
Membership can address fundamental questions of legitimacy that are likely con-
strain efforts to expand the organization to other policy areas and may even
affect the ability of the system as it exists today to continue to operate. He discusses
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the prospects and preconditions for the WTO to evolve into a more constitutional
order, highlighting the critical importance of civil society in this regard, the huge
challenge that exists in deﬁning this concept in a global context, and the likelihood
this challenge will preclude greater constitutionalization of the WTO.
A common theme of many of the Symposium articles is the importance of analy-
sis of both the economic incentives and political constraints confronting rule-
making in a multi-polar world economy, and on the need to take process and
design questions seriously. Many of the authors conclude that for the WTO to
remain relevant, greater acceptance is needed of small group cooperation inside
the organization. This may take the form of critical mass or plurilateral agreements,
or building on the approach taken in the TFA by explicitly addressing differences in
implementation capacity on a country-by-country basis. A more concerted effort to
form clubs in the WTOwould recognize the heterogeneity of the membership while
addressing the difﬁculty of making SDT time-bound and limiting it to the countries
that need it. However, as also emphasized by several contributors, plurilateral
agreements in core areas of trade policy, such as market access and agricultural
support, may not be desirable or feasible if they are a ﬁnal outcome rather than
an intermediate step. At the end of the day, full internalization of the spillovers
created by many domestic policies can only be achieved through multilateral agree-
ments. Investing more effort in identifying ex ante a negotiating set that offers
greater economic and political ‘gains from trade’ than was the case in the DDA,
as well as adopting simpler negotiation modalities that avoid the need for extensive
exceptions and ﬂexibilities to address country heterogeneity and facilitate cross-
issue linkages between the main players are two suggestions made by several con-
tributors to this Symposium.
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